Introduction
The regulatory constraints of stock exchanges play an important role in the economic development of emerging or developing economies. Over the past decade, the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange (BMSE) has become an increasingly important avenue for listed firms to access capital. Disclosure of corporate information to stakeholders is essential in order for listed firms to raise capital. Hutton (2004) attests that corporate voluntary disclosure continues to be important because information is vital for the efficient functioning of capital markets and in building investor confidence.
The extent of voluntary disclosure has been an area of interest to accounting researchers over the two past decades. Healy & Palepu (2001, p.407) believe that "financial accounting and disclosure will continue to be a rich field of empirical inquiry". Beattie (2005) is not unreasonable to expect that changes in the disclosure incentives and practices will come about as a consequence of these environmental changes. Malaysian corporations. The World Bank (1999) reports that, on average, 60% of the total equity in Malaysian listed firms is held by the top five shareholders. The impact of ownership structure is of particular significance as Malaysia endeavours to become a major international capital market (Shimomoto, 1999) . In a capital market setting, the ability of firms to raise capital for investment and growth at competitive rates depends on firm's communication This study provides a segmented longitudinal examination of voluntary disclosure patterns and its association with corporate governance structure and ownership structure subsequent to the implementation of regulatory initiatives in Malaysia. A unique corporate governance score comprising thirteen governance attributes is used to assess the strength of the corporate governance structure. The findings of this study are particularly relevant to regulators and policy-makers given the important roles that corporate governance structure and ownership structure play in mitigating agency problems.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates the Malaysian corporate reporting and governance environment; Section 3 discusses relevant prior literature and the hypotheses; Section 4 describes the data and methodology; Section 5 presents the study findings and robustness testing; and Section 6 concludes the study with final comments, limitations and suggestions for future research.
Corporate reporting and governance in Malaysia
Prior to 1996, the Malaysian corporate reporting was self-regulated and intermittently overseen by accounting professional bodies, such as the Malaysian Institute of Accountants and Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants. The regulatory regime that governed the financial reporting was merit-based where the firms disclosed the information as required and were accountable to regulators (Securities Commission, 1999) . Since the disclosure was arguably not user-oriented, the limited information flow under this regime effectively lowered market incentives for greater disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006 their own disclosure practices with the purpose of assisting companies to move beyond minimum disclosure practices (Bursa Malaysia, 2004) .
From this overview of the regulation of corporate reporting and governance in Malaysia, it is apparent that these developments have had a substantial impact on a firm's disclosure policy.
The challenges for corporations and regulators are to continue to enhance the levels of transparency, governance and accountability in the Malaysian capital market.
Literature review and hypotheses development
Agency theory is most commonly used framework in the accounting literature to analyse voluntary disclosure choice. The theory models the relationship between the principal and the agent as identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . The separation of the ownership and control gives rise to agency problems because of goals conflict between shareholders and managers (Eisenhardt, 1989) . In the context of the firm, a major issue arising from such separation is the extent of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. The agency theory approach argues that a firm's choice to disclose information is a function of managerial discretion to better solve the problem of information asymmetry. Voluntary corporate disclosure is mainly driven by rational managers' self-interest and their attempts to protect and enhance their reputation and remuneration. To the extent that voluntary disclosure is beneficial, managers need to apply their discretion in disclosing information to stakeholders, thereby reducing the costs of the agency relationship (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ).
Effective corporate governance offers crucial monitoring mechanisms to co-align managerial behaviour with owner preferences or to monitor the actions of the managers (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Core (2001) highlight that a firm's governance structure can influence the nature of its disclosure policy in the sense that a well-designed governance structure can help ensure an optimal firm's disclosure policy. Prior empirical studies have examined the association between corporate disclosure and specific governance attributes such as board independence, role duality, audit committee; but these studies produce inconclusive evidence. Recently, the use of an index-based corporate governance measure and its relation to corporate disclosure has started to gain researchers' attention in recent years (Beekes and Brown, 2006; O'Sullivan, Percy, and Stewart, 2008; Taylor, Tower, and Neilson, 2010) . According to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , such a direct proxy measure of corporate governance is more effective in capturing the strength of a firm's governance structure. Byard, Li, and Weintrop (2006) and Beekes and Brown (2006) document better-governed firms make more informative disclosure in U.S. and Australian firms respectively. Similarly, Taylor, Tower, and Neilson (2010) Essentially, the adoption of the principles of corporate governance ensures management will act in the best interest of shareholders and investors and contribute to a reduction in information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Agency theory predicts that effective corporate governance can strengthen the monitoring and control of management, thereby reducing opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Thus, it is reasonable to assume that effective corporate governance will have a positive impact on the extent of voluntary disclosures. Consistent with agency theory, this study hypothesizes:
The strength of a firm's corporate governance structure is positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Ownership structure is an important aspect of corporate governance particularly in determining the nature of the agency problem. Due to the separation of ownership and control, agency theory suggests that there is a high likelihood of agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) with the potential for conflict to be greater when shares are widely held than when shares are tightly controlled (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The degree of separation between ownership and management determines the level of monitoring (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) and thereby, the extent of voluntary disclosure. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large (outside) ownership can help reduce agency conflicts due to their dominant power and incentive to prevent expropriation by insiders. In this regard, the dominant shareholders play a monitoring role and can be expected to put more pressure on management to disclose additional information.
Empirically, Birt et al. (2006) find a positive association between ownership concentration and voluntary segment disclosure of Australian listed firms. They argue that when ownership is concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, they have the ability to mitigate agency problems by influencing information disclosure. Consistent with this view, Ho and Tower (2010) report that firm's with concentrated ownership structure have greater incentives to provide more information. They contend that large (outside) shareholders act as guardian to minority shareholders in influencing firm's disclosure choice. As such, greater information is disclosed in annual reports on a voluntary basis. Similarly, Jiang, Habib, and Hu (2011) acknowledge the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structures in reducing information asymmetry in New Zealand. Consequently, the hypothesis to be tested is:
The higher the proportion of shares held by the top 5 shareholders, the greater will be the extent of voluntary disclosure.
To test H1 and H2, this study includes firm-specific non-governance characteristics as control variables (firm size, leverage and industry types) in order to minimise cross-sectional variation. These control variables are reported in extant literature as being associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Firm size has been identified as an important predictor of corporate reporting behaviour. Due to high agency costs, large firms have the incentive to disclose more information in their annual reports to enhance reputation, reduce public scrutiny and to deter government intervention. A large volume of empirical research documents a positive association between firm size and the extent of disclosure (Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Botosan, 1997; Naser, Al-Khatib, and Karbhari, 2002) . From the perspective of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that high monitoring costs would be incurred by firms that are highly leveraged because there is more wealth to transfer from bondholders to shareholders.
Management may voluntarily disclose more information in annual reports for monitoring purposes. Wallace, Naser, and Mora (1994) suggest that disclosure level is likely to vary based on industry, reflecting unique characteristics. Cooke (1989) draws attention to the likelihood that leading firms operating in a particular industry could have a bandwagon effect on the level of disclosure adopted by other firms within the same industry.
Research Design

Sample selection
The sample is drawn from firms listed on the BMSE in 1996, 2001 and 2006. The following criteria is used in selecting sample firms: (i) the availability of annual reports of firms for all the three years; (ii) firms selected in 1996 must remain listed on the stock exchange in the other two years; and (iii) all banks, unit trust, insurance and finance companies are excluded from the study due to different regulatory and reporting requirements. The remaining firms are then subject to stratified random selection from five industry groups namely trading and services; construction; industrial products; plantation; and consumer products. A total of 100 sample firms are randomly selected in 1996, which represents 31.8% of the population. These firms selected are chosen as the sample firms for the other two periods. The matched sample research approach, as recommended by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) , is then used to capture the effect of changes in corporate governance regulations on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The annual reports of sample firms are retrieved from the BMSE.
Dependent variable -voluntary disclosure index
This study uses a self-constructed disclosure index to gauge the extent of voluntary disclosure. An extensive review of prior studies is undertaken to check for common determinants of voluntary disclosure especially those attributes applicable to developing countries. Drawing on prior disclosure studies in developing countries (eg. Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Barako, Hancock, and Izan, 2006; Alsaeed, 2005; Gul and Leung, 2004) Adopting Meek, Roberts, and Gray (1995) approach, this study does not weight any of the items comprising the voluntary disclosure index. Each item is scored as 1 if disclosed and 0 if it is not, subject to the applicability of the item concerned. Weighting of items is not used because the focus of this study is not directed at a particular user group. Moreover, prior research has shown that unweighted and weighted approaches produce very similar results when there are a large number of items included (Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley, 2004; Barako, Hancock, and Izan, 2006) . Voluntary disclosure index score (VDIS) is calculated for each firm in each period, expressed as follows:
where VDIS jt is the voluntary disclosure index score for firm j year t; n j is the number of items applicable to j th firm; jt n is the total possible maximum number of items (85); X jt is voluntary disclosure item where a value of 1 is assigned if the firm discloses information about this item; and 0 if otherwise.
Explanatory variables
This study captures the strength of corporate governance by developing a score comprising thirteen governance items. where subscript jt refers as firm j in year t; VDIS jt = voluntary disclosure index; CGS jt = corporate governance score being the composite measurement of thirteen corporate governance attributes; OCON jt = ownership concentration measured as the ratio of total shares held by top five shareholders to total number of shares issued; FSIZE jt = firm size measured as natural log of total assets; LEV jt = leverage as ratio of debt to equity; IND1 jt -IND5 jt = 1 if the company is in the consumer product sector, industrial product sector, construction and property sector, trading and services sector and plantation sector respectively; 0 if otherwise; β 0 = intercept; β 1 -β 9 = estimated coefficient for each item;  jt = error term.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive results of VDIS and five sub-categories information are provided as Table 1 .
There is a wide range in VDIS throughout the study period. In 1996, the lowest VDIS is 1.2% 
Multivariate results
The results of the multivariate test of the hypotheses developed are presented in Birt et al. (2006) and Jiang, Habib, and Hu (2011) who report that a concentrated ownership structure can have a positive influence on managements' disclosure decisions. The positive association between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure supports the notion that concentrated ownership structure implies stronger monitoring capacity by dominant shareholders thereby influencing management to disclose voluntary information more extensively. The positive relationship concurs with the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) although it is inconsistent with the agency theoretical stance. A possible explanation for this is that dominant shareholders' control is stronger in providing effective monitoring in Malaysia. The substantial shareholders comprising blockholders, government agencies, banks, insurance companies, pension funds etc. help to create strong incentives to monitor corporate disclosure practices to reduce information asymmetry.
With regard to the control variables, firm size is consistently positively and statistically significantly (at the 1% levels) associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in all years.
These results confirm that the firm size is a very important attribute associated with the extent of voluntary disclosures in annual reports. Reasons for this association may relate to public scrutiny, expanded resources and the need to suppress high agency cost typical of large firms.
Leverage lacks statistical significance in all years, suggesting that a company's gearing status has no bearing on the extent of information voluntarily disclosed. There appears to be no evidence that the extent of voluntary disclosure is industry-related. The coefficients for the rest of the industry-type dummies are not significant except in 2006 where trading and service sector tends to disclose less voluntary information disclosure. Relative secrecy on the part of companies in this sector may reflect a fear incurring proprietary costs through disclosure to competitors.
Robustness tests
Additional tests are conducted to check the robustness of the findings. To supplement the earlier findings, data is transformed and run using rank regression and normal scores approaches (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Cooke, 1998) . The results of the additional rank regression and normal scores analysis (not shown for brevity) highlight that corporate governance structure is positively and significantly associated with voluntary disclosure in 2001 and 2006; and ownership structure is a significant positive predictor of the extent of voluntary disclosure in all three observation periods across the two approaches. Importantly, the additional tests highlight that the variables identified as significant predictors of the extent of voluntary disclosure are the same as the main statistical test on untransformed data.
Overall, the results are robust across different approaches. This multiple-tiered analysis provides comfort to the validity of the main statistical findings.
The multiple regression model used in the study implicitly assumes the exogenous determination of both corporate governance and ownership structure variables. However, a concern arises from the possibility of the endogenous determination of corporate governance and ownership structure. The model may suffer from causality as well as unobserved heterogeneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) where the explanatory corporate governance and ownership structure variables may be endogenous and correlated with the residuals in the regression model. Should endogeneity adversely bias the OLS models used in this study, it would be difficult to interpret the association between corporate governance and ownership structure and voluntary disclosure. The study takes advantage of the longitudinal design of this study and employs panel data OLS regression with firm fixed-effects to eliminate endogeneity, as suggested by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) . The observation from the pooled results (not shown for brevit) shows that the model is significant with an F-value of 33.15 and an adjusted R 2 of 53.4%. The result indicates that voluntary disclosure by Malaysian companies has increased over the eleven-year period and is statistically significant. Corporate governance structure, ownership structure and firms size are positively and significantly associated with voluntary disclosure practices.
Another method to address potential endogeneity is to examine the association between changes in the levels of governance (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) . This approach is appropriate since there is less likely to be a corresponding change in any potential omitted variable that is correlated with both the dependent and independent variables. The setback of this approach is that the change in independent variables may be relatively minor between periods compared to the change in dependent variable. Nonetheless, the change multiple regression is conducted and the results (not shown for brevity) indicate that there is no significant association between the change in voluntary disclosure and the change in corporate governance and ownership structure. This further analysis lessens any possible concern of the endogeneity in the determination of corporate governance and ownership structure.
Implications and conclusions
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent of voluntarily disclosed information Legend: The table provides the descriptive statistics of the overall extent of voluntary disclosure and the five major sub-categories of voluntary disclosure. These sub-categories included CSI = corporate and strategic disclosure index; FCMI = financial and capital market data disclosure index; DSMI = directors and senior management disclosure index; FLI = forward-looking disclosure index; and CSRI = corporate social responsibility disclosure index. The table shows the results of the regression model which tests the association between voluntary disclosure for all sample firms over each of the three years (1996, 2001 & 2006) against the independent and control variables. The coefficients of the excluded dummy variables are 1.000 since they act as benchmarks for the included dummies. Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the CGS, OCON, FSIZE and LEV variables since the associated hypotheses are directional while the two-tailed probabilities are used for the tests of the industry membership variables. 
APPENDIX 1 Voluntary Disclosure Instrument
